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Price, 4 Pick. 485; Beckwith v. Angell, 6 Conn. 315; Oakley v.
Booman, 21 Wend. 588; Greenaught v. Sneed, 3 Ohio St. 415; Sto.
Prom. Notes, § 133, 477; 1 Dan. Neg. Instr. 715. I find no cases
where he has been treated simply as an endorser. And even if the
presumption of law arising solely from the advancement of a past
due note were the same as in the case of endorsement at the incep-
tion of the note, the facts and circumstances attending the endorse-
ment in the present instance would remove the presumption and
bring it within the authorities.
The decree of the chancellor must be reversed with costs,
and a decree entered here in accordance with this
opinion.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.1
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. 2
SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN.3
SUPREME COURT COMMISSION OF OHIO. 4
ADMIRALTY.
Proceedings in rem are exclusively cognisable in the admiralty, and
the question whether a case is made for the recall of property released
under bond, or stipulation in such a case, must, beyond all doubt, be
determined by the courts empowered to hear and determine the matter
in controversy in the pending suit: United States v. Ames et al., S. C.
U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
ANIMALS.
Owner's Liability for Injury by them.-The owner of domestic or
other animals not naturally inclined to commit mischief, such as dogs,
horses and oxen, is not liable for any injury committed by them to the
person or personal property of another, unless it be shown such owner
previously had notice of the animal's mischievous propensity, or that the
injury is attributable to some other neglect on his part, it being in gen-
eral necessary, in an action for injury committed by such animals, to
allege and prove a scienter: Marean v. Vanatta, 88 Ills.
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1878. The cases will probably be reported in 7 or 8 Otto.
2 From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 88 Ills. Reports.
From H. A. Chaney, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 40 Michigan Reports.
' Fom E. L. DeWitt, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 32 Ohio State Reports.
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BANK.
Liability of Stockholder.-Where a clause of the charter of a bank
was in the following language, viz.. "the persons and property of the
stockholders shall at all times be liable, pledged and bound fbr the
redemption of bills and notes at any time issued, in proportion to the
number of shares that each individual and corporation may hold and
possess :" Held, that this provision created a personal liability on the
part of the stockholder for all the notes of the bank, in the proportion
that the shares held by him bore to all the shares of its capital stock,
which any bill-holder could enforce upon the insolvency of the bank, by
separate action to the extent of his claim : Mills v. Scott, S. 0. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1878.
An action for debt will lie where the amount of the bank's outstand-
ing indebtedness and the number of shares held by the stockholder can be
stated. In such cases, the extent of the latter's liability is fixed, and
the amount with which he should be charged is a matter of mere arith-
metical calculation : Id.
Actions for debt will always lie where the amount sought to be
recovered is certain or can be ascertained from fixed data by computa-
tion : Id.
BANKRUPTCY.
Fraud, definition of within the meaning of the Bankrupt Act -Fraud,
as used in sect. 5117 of the Revised Statutes, means positive fraud or
fraud in fact, involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong, as does
embezzlement; and not implied fraud or fraud in law, which may exist
without imputation of bad faith or immorality: Wolf et al. v. Stix et
al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
It does not include such fraud as the law implies from the purchase
of property from a debtor with the intent thereby to hinder and delay
his creditors in the collection of their debts : Id.
Such a purchase does not create a debt from the purchaser to the
creditors. As between the debtor and the purchaser, the sale is good,
but as between a creditor and the purchaser it is void. The purchasei
does not by his purchase subject himself to a liability to pay to cred-
itors the value of what he buys. All the risk he runs is that the sale
may be avoided and the property reclaimed for the benefit of creditors:
Id.
To come within this exception in the Bankrupt Act the debt must be
created by fraud: Id.
BrLs AND NOTES.
Release of Joint-maker's liabilit2/.-A joint-maker, signing for accom.
modation merely, is released by an extension granted without his know-
ledge or acquiescence: Barron v. Cadyi, 40 Mich.
BOUNDARY.
Estoppel by Deed.-Where parties claiming under the same grantoi
recognise a boundary between them, and one of them afterwards con
veys with reference to that boundary and without encroaching upon an
rights existing in third parties, he and those who claim under him are
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bound by the description as against his grantee, and a change of the
recognised boundary by a re-survey will not affect the grantee's rights:
Fahey v. Marsh, 40 Mich.
CERTIORARI.
Not a Writ of Right.-The common-law writ of certiorari, when
used for the purpose of correcting the proceedings of inferior tribunals.
is not a writ of right, but it issues only upon application to the court
upon special cause shown ; and when great public detriment or incon-
venience may result from interfering with their proceedings, the writ
should be denied: Trustees, &c., v. SIhool Directors, 88 Ills.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE.
When for Security only, it is not necessarily braudulent.-Although
a chattel mortgage on its face may appear to be given to secure an abso-
lute debt, yet, if in good faith it is given in the most part to secure
against a contingent liability as surety, the latter being a good consider-
ation, it will not thereby be held fraudulent and void as to creditors of
the mortgagor, and although the mortgagee has not in fact paid any-
thing as surety, still, if he will have to pay debts as such, he may hold
the property or its proceeds to apply upon the debt for which he is
surety: Goodheart v. Johnson, 88 Ills.
COMMON CARRIER.
Whether bound to carry to Destination.-Although goods shipped at
New York city are marked to the consignee at Bloomington, Ills., the
presumption of a contract to carry them to the latter point from the
acceptance of the same so marked, may be contradicted and overcome,
by proof of an express contract to carry to Chicago only: JMerchants'
Dispatch and Trans. Co. v. Moore, 88 Ills.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Police Power of States, not infringed by Constitution.-The police
power of the states was not surrendered when the people of the United
States conferred upon Congress the general power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations and between the several states: Patterson v. Ken.
tucky, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
The police power extends, at least, to the protection of the lives, the
health and the property of the community against the injurious exer-
cise by any citizen of his own rights : Id.
State legislation, strictly and legitimately for police purposes, does
not, in the sense of the constitution, necessarily intrench upon any
authority which has been confided expressly or by necessary implication
to the national government: Id.
A statute of Kentucky provided that certain oils used for illuminat-
ing purposes should be inspected by an authorized state officer before
being used, sold or offered for sale-such as ignite or permanently burn
at a temperature of 130 degrees Fahrenheit and upwards, were recog-
nised by the statute as standard oils, while those which ignite or per-
manently burn at a less temperature were condemned as unsafe for
illuminating purposes. Held, that this statute was a police regulation,
and did not conflict with iny provision of the federal constitution: Id.
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CONTRACT.
Right to Rescnd.-V'hen two parties contract to act as agents tc
canvass for and sell sewing machines for a company in a particular
locality, and the company withdraws them from such place, they will
have the right to rescind the contract and cease to act; but if they
have given a bond, with sureties, for the performance of their duties,
which reserves to the company the right to change the character of the
employment, within the scope of the business of the company. they
will not have the right to rescind, although directed to canvass in a
different locality: .owe Sewing Machine Co. v. Layman, 88 Ill.
CORPORATION. See Bank; Evidence; Officer.
Contract of.-The contract of a corporation is presumed to be infrcz
vires until the contrary is made to appear: The Southern Exprecs Co.
v. The Western North, Carolina Railroad Co. et al., S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1878.
CRIMINAL LAW. See Witness.
Absence of Guilty lntent-Evidence.-Where one does an act appar-
ently in violation of a criminal statute, but, in fact, under circumstances
that tend to show a want of guilty intention, the excusing circumstances
may be given in evidence on the trial, to show his good faith in the
transaction, where that is a material element, or that he was ignorant of
the facts that would mnake his acts criminal: 1arrd v. The State, 32
Ohio St.
A person indicted for selling intoxicating liquors,; in violation of the
provisions of section 1 of the act to provide against the evils resulting
from the sale of intoxicating liquors in the state of Ohio, may, on the
trial, show that at the time he bought the article alleged in the indict-
ment to be intoxicating liquor, it was represented to him to be free from
alcoholic properties-that he bought it with the understanding and
believing that.it was not intoxicating liquor, and sold it with such under-
standing and belief: Id.
DAMAGES.
Measure of Damages for defects in Machinery bought on Contract.-
The measure of damages for putting up a steam boiler with such defects
as to make it worth less than the contract price, is the difference between
its value in its defective condition and its value if completed in compli-
ance with the contract: White v. Brockway, 40 Mich.
DEBT. See Bank.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR
Purchases made in contemplation of Insolvency-Fraud-.-A merchant
who had sold goods to a firm just before its failure claimed to have
relied on the assurance of a partner that their assets exceeded their lia-
bilities. It was shown that when the vendor's agent had asked one of
the firm how he reconciled this assurance with the failure, the latter
said something about having lost a good deal of money in a series of
years in failures: Reld, that even though this answer may not have
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been material, its admission was harmless: Shipman v. Seymour, 40
Mich.
An agent was instructed to inquire into a customer's credit and to sell
to him if he was satisfied with his answers. He sent an order to his
principal without communicating the answers, and the order was filled :
Held, that the principal had a right to assume that.the inquiries were
made and that the answers were satisfactory to the agent befbre he sent
the order: Id.
In an action involving the good faith of a firm in buying goods just
before they failed, a written answer to an inquiry by the vendor as to
their credit, which though true in fact was false in spirit and tended to
mislead, was admissible in evidence: Id.
Any purchase obtained by false representations as to solvency made
by a firm within a period before its failure equal to the period of credit
usually allowed to it upon its purchases, may be shown as bearing on the
question whether another purchase made within that period was fraud-
ulent or not, in contemplation of insolvency: Id.
No inference of fraud can be drawn from the fact that money not yet
due remains unpaid, but there is no error in admitting testimony that
the purchase price of goods purchased by means of a falsehood, is still
unpaid: Id.
It is an act of bad faith for a mortgagee to withhold from record a
mortgage given him by a debtor in order to shield the latter from
demands that have been contracted in ignorance of its existence: Id.
When the good faith of a mortgage is in question, the time when it
was filed and the use afterwards made of it, may be shown: Id.
A purchase made by one who is insolvent -and with the purpose not
to pay, is void even though the buyer has not made false representa-
tions: Id.
DEED. See Boundary.
Proof to Impeach acknowledgmet.-Very clear and satisfactory proof
is required to impeach a certificate of the acknowledgment of a deed or
mortgage. The uncorroborated testimony of the grantor, or party exe-
-uting the same, is not sufficient to overcome the evidence afforded by the
officer's certificate of the fact, especially when the execution of the deed
is not denied, or any undue influence, coercion or fraud shown: XcPher-
son v. Sanborn, 88 Ills.
EJECTMENT.
Right of recovery between successive ortgayees.-In ejectment, where
both parties are mortgagees, and they both claim from a common source,
the party having the oldest mortgage, from the common mortgagor, who
first forecloses and acquires a deed must prevail, as having the paramount
legal title. If the junior mortgagee has equitable rights by not being
made a party to the foreclosure, he must resort to a court of chancery:
Aholtz v. Zellar, 88 Ills
ESTOPPEL. See Boundary; United States.
EVIDENCE. See Debtor and Creditor; Insurance.
Proof of Relationship.-Interrogatories relating to family relation-
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ship, dates of decease and marriages, may well be answered on the basis
of fhmily tradition instead of direct personal knowledge : Van Sickle v.
Gibson, 40 Mich.
Parol Evidelce to modify Written Agremezts-Resolutions of Appoint-
ment-Corporation.-W here a private corporation has power to employ
a superintendent, the entry in its proper record book, of a resolution of
appointment passed by its directors, is admissible to help establish a
claim for salary: Kalamazoo Novelty Manufacturing Works v. Macalister,
40 Mich.
Where the immediate issue is whether there was a contract in writing,
oral testimony bearing on that issue cannot be excluded on the assump-
tion that such writing exists : Id.
A resolution of appointment is primafacie not a contract, and can be
withdrawn or altered before acceptance : .d.
The rule excluding oral evidence to affect a written contract does not
apply to a corporate resolution appointing an officer, so as to exclude
evidence to show the actual establishment of contract relations under
it: Id.
Must relate to the Issue.-Evidence must be confined to the issue, and.
even for the purpose of corroborating the testimony of witnesses, an
inquiry into facts entirely collateral, leading to a controversy over mat-
ters altogether foreign to the case before the court cannot be permitted:
Henkle v. McClure, 32 Ohio St.
FORMER ADJUDICATION. See Set-off.
FRAUD. See Bankruptcy; Debtor and Creditor.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Parol promise to Pay- What is another's Debt.-E. contracts with S.
to build a house, and S. contracts with G. to furnish labor and materials.
G. refuses to furnish such labor and materials, except upon a promise
made to him by E. that he himself will pay the bill out offunds coming
to S. : Held, to be a contract not within the Statute of Frauds so as to
make a writing necessary: Estabrook v. Gebhart, 32 Ohio St.
The work being done, and it being agreed by all that E. should pay
G., who was to give up his claim against S. and look to E. alone for pay-
ment; this is such a contract as need not be in writing under the
statute: id.
GOVERNMENT. See United States.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Trust; Witness
Married Woman- Charging her Separate Estate-Subscription to Cor-
poration.-An indebtedness incurred by a married woman, for the
benefit of herself or her separate property, and upon its credit, and the
giving of a note or other obligation therefor, are facts from which a court
of equity may imply and enforce a charge against such property : Rice
v. Railroad 0o., 32 Ohio St.
But an intention to charge such property, will not be implied, merely
from the giving of a note or other obligation by a married woman: Id.
Neither will her separate property be made liable for her genoral
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engagements, in the absence of a contract valid in law to bind the same,
or of such facts and circumstances as make it, as between the parties,
just and equitable : ld.
When a married woman subscribes to capital stock of a railroad cor-
poration, by which she agrees to take and pay for a certain number of
shares of said stock, but makes default in payment, and action is
brought to charge her separate property with the amount of such sub-
scription : Held, That in the absence of any proof that either party
dealt on the credit of such property, equity will not imply or enforce a
charge against the same: Id.
Dower-Mortgage.-Where, in a suit brought to enforce a vendor's
lien for purchase-money, to which the vendee and his wife, and also the
holder of a subsequent mortgage executed by the vendee alone, are
made defendants, and the proceeds of sale of the land covered by the
liens are more than sufficient to discharge the vendor's claim, the wife
is entitled, as against such mortgagees, to assert her contingent right
of dower in the surplus fund: Unger v. Leiter, 32 Ohio St.
But such right of the wife must be protected in a mode which will
not interfere with the right of the mortgagee to subject the whole estate
of the husband in the premises, to the present satisfaction of the mort-
gage debt, in its order of priority : Id.
Therefore, when such surplus is insufficient to discharge fully, the
mortgage debt, the court should not (against the will of the mortgagee)
direct one-third of the surplus fund to be put on interest by the sheriff,
during the life of the wife, for the purpose of securing her contingent
dower interest: Id.
The proper course, in such case, is to award to the wife from the
surplus fund, the value of her contingent right of dower therein, to be
ascertained by reference to the tables of recognised authority on that
subject, in connection with bhe state of health, and constitutional vigor
of the wife and her husband: Id.
INJUNCTION. See Nuisance.
INSURANCE.
Perils of _Navigation-Seawortliiness-Evidence.-When a steam-
boat is shown to have been seaworthy at the time she was insured, and
no intervening circumstance occurs to render her unseaworthy, her sea-
Worthiness is presumed to continue; but when, during the life of the
policy, she springs a dangerous leak, without apparent cause, a new pre-
sumption arises-that of unseaworthiness; yet, as this new presump-
tion is not a conclusive one, the owners are not required, to entitle them
to recover for the loss, to show the identical cause of her loss, but may
show a probable cause: Insurance Co. v. Tobin, 32 Ohio St.
In case of loss from some unknown cause, a person conversant with
steamboat navigation, and who is, from actual experience, familiar with
the perils attending steamboat navigation on the privileged waters and
other of the western rivers, may give his opinion, and say whether a
steamboat, while being navigated thereon, with ordinary skill and care,
might, without apparent or known cause, suddenly spring a leak and
mink from some unknown peril of the river: Rd.
DAVEY v. SHANNON.
When the actual effect of a known agency is unknown, and the opinion
of one familiar, by actual observation, with the matter under considera-
tion, is the best testimony the subject-matter to be investigated affords,
the opinion of such person may be received as testimony; hence, it was
competent to receive as testimony the opinion of skilled river naviga-
tors, familiar with the subject, as to the effect the wave-swells nade by
a larger steamboat would have upon a smaller and heavily-laden one,
while passing: Id.
The statements of a steamboat captain, made in the discharge of his
duty as 'commander of the vessel, while she is in a sinking condition,
and be is in the act of seeking aid of another to relieve her from pres-
ent peril of loss, as to her perilous condition, how and where she was
leaking, made under such circumstances, his statements accompanying
his acts, and explanatory of them, are res gestz, and therefore compe-
tent testimony: Id.
Waiver of Forfeiture.-Where a mutual insurance company imposes
forfeiture, in case a loss occurs while its assessments are still unpaid,
but its local agent receives past due assessments with knowledge of a
loss and forwards them to the company without notifying them of it,
and they receive them and two or three weeks afterward order the loss
to be paid when adjusted, they cannot afterward refuse payment on the
ground of delay in paying the assessments, since they have waived that
by receiving them when over due and ordering payment: Farmers'
Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Bowen, 40 Mich.
A note written by plaintiff's attorney before suit, and expressing the
opinion that defendant is not liable, is not admissible in evidence for
the defence: Id.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See Criminal Law.
JURY. See Trial.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Risks of EmpTloy.ent-lnjury to Railroad Employee -A switchman
while standing on the foot-board of a tender that was backing on a side-
track, let go the hand-rail to shift his lantern from one hand to the other,
and was thrown off by a jerk caused by a worn rail left there by his fel-
low employees, the trackmen. He had full means of knowing the con-
dition of the track, and the custom of the road as to using worn rails
for side-tracks : Held, that the risk was one of the ordinary risks of his
employment, and that he had no ground of recovery: Michigan Central
Railroad ao. v. Austin, 40 Mich
MORTGAGE. See Debtor and Creditor; Ejectment; Husband and Wife.
NUISANCE.
Injunction against threatened Nuisance.-Whether injunction to re-
strain threatened injury is matter of right-Quzre. Hall v. Rood, 40
Mich.
Injunction will not be granted where such relief is disproportionate
to the injury: Id.
A wooden building encroached six inches on a private alley for more
than twenty years. The owner attempted to veneer it with brick, where-
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by it would encroach three inches more. It did not appear that the
encroachment would materially injure the right of way. Ileld, that the
adjacent owner was not entitled to remedy by injunction: Id.
OFFICER.
When delegated authority presumed.-The law presumes that persons
acting in a public office have been duly appointed, and are acting with
authority, until the contrary is shown. If officers of corporations openly
exercise a power which presupposes a delegated authority for the pur-
pose, the acts of such officers will be deemed rightful, and the delegated
authority will be presumed: Keely v. Sanders et al., S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1878.
An officer defacto is not a mere usurper, nor yet within the sanction
of law, but one who, colore officii, claims and assumes to exercise official
authority, is reputed to have it, and the community acquiesces accord-
ingly : Russey v. Smith, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
The acts of such officers are held to be valid because the public good
requires it: Id.
PARENT AND CHILD.
Liability of Father for Necessaries supplied to Infant.-Where a
father has supplied his minor son with necessaries, or is ready to supply
them, he cannot be bound by a contract the son may make with a third
person for the purchase of goods without his authority, although they
may be regarded as necessaries: Johnson v. Smallwood, 88 Ills.
PAYMENT.
When voluntary, cannot be recovered back, though demand illegal and
written Protestfiled- Taxation.-Where a party pays an illegal demand
with a full knowledge of all the facts which render such demand illegal,
without an immediate and urgent necessity therefor, or unless to release
his person or property from detention, or to prevent an immediate seizure
ofhis person or property, such payment must be deemed voluntary and
cannot be recovered back. And the fact that the party at the time of
making the payment files a written protest does not make the payment
involuntary: Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. County Commissioners of
Dodge Co., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
When, however, a party not liable to taxation is called upon peremp-
torily to pay upon a tax-warrant, and he can save himself and his
property in no other way than by paying the illegal demand, he may
give notice that he so pays it by duress and not voluntarily, and by
showing that he is not liable, recover it back: Id.
Where, however, no attempt has been made to serve a tax-warrant,
but before any active steps whatever have been taken to enforce the
collection of taxes, one present himself at the tax-office, and in the
usual course of business pays in full everything that is charged against
him, accompanying the payment, however, with a general protest against
the legality of the charges and a notice that suit would be commenced
to recover back the full amount that is paid: Held, that such a payment
is not compulsory in such a sense as to give a right to recover the
money back; Id.
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RAILROAD. See Ataster and Servant.
SA.LE. See Debtor and Creditor.
SET-OFF.
Set.off of Judgment-Former Adjudicatio.-B. bad a contract
with .1., but sued him on the common counts before a justice to recover
hack an overpayment. He did not put the contract in issue, though he
gave M. credits under it. M. filed no set-off, but immediately sued B.
betire another justice for the whole amount of his bill : ileld, that the
judgment in the first suit did not bar the second : cEiren v. Bigeloto,
40 Mich.
A plaintiff cannot fix the amount of a contested bill by giving credit
for what he claims it should be : Id.
A defendant can withhold his claim of set-off to be litigated in
another suit: Id.
A judgment recovered before one justice can be ascertained and
applied by another in satisfaction of a counter claim recovered before
him by the other party : Id.
STATUTE.
When Remedy is exclusive -Where a statute creates a new offence
by prohibiting and making unlawful anything which was lawful before,
and provides a specific remedy against such new offence (not antece-
dently unlawful) by a particular sanction and method of proceeding, that
method of proceeding and none other, must be preserved: Commission-
ers, &c. v. Bank of Findley, 32 Ohio St.
By sect. 15 of " an act to establish an independent treasury of the
state of Ohio," any person advising, aiding or participating in the loan-
ing of the public moneys, is, with the public officer who makes such
loan, guilty of embezzlement, and, on conviction, is subject to imprison-
ment and to a fine in double the amount so embezzled. Such fine is a
judgment in favor of the party whose funds are so embezzled, to be col-
lected as other judgments at law, and can only be satisfied or released
by such party : Reld, that for a violation of said section, by advising,
aiding or participating in lending the public moneys, this section pro-
vides for a new offence, and gives a specific remedy to the injured party
in the judgment therein provided for, and such remedy is exclusive of
a civil action for the same offence: Id.
TAXATImN.
Presumption against Exemption.-The power of taxation is an attri.
bute of sovereignty, and is essential to every independent government.
Stripped of this power it must perish. Whoever, therefore, claims its
surrender must show it in language which will admit of no other reason-
able construction. If a doubt arise as to the intent of the legislature.
it must be solved in favor of the state: Hoqe v. Richmond and Dan-
ville. Railroad Co., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
TRIAL.
Practice- Opening and Conclusion to Jury.-The party holding the
affirmative of the issue, as a general rule, ought to open and close the
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evidence and argument, and there being a number of issues, if the
plaintiff holds the affirmative of any one, or if any evidence material to
his case is required of him, he ought to begin. In determining the
question, however, upon a complicated state of pleading, a liberal discre-
tion is allowed to the court trying the cause, and this discretion will not
be reviewed, except upon a plain case of error : Montgomery v. Swindler,
32 Ohio St.
Juror-fisconduct of.-The mere fact that ajuror in a civil case drank
intoxicating liquor during an adjournment of the court while the trial
was in progress, is not a sufficient reason for granting a new trial, unless
there be reason to suspect it may have had some influence on the final
result of the case: Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and St. Louis Railway Co. v.
Porter, 32 Ohio St.
Any attempt on the part of the prevailing party or his attorney in the
case, to corrupt a juror, though it be not shown to be successful, is
a good ground for a new trial: Id.
Where it appears that during the progress of a trial, the prevailing
party or his attorney has furnished intoxicating liquors to a juror, it is
a good ground for a new trial, unless it is clearly shown that it was not
intended to influence his action in the case, and that it had no influence
on his mind as a juror: Id.
TRUST.
Implied-Evidence-Husband and Wife.-A trust raised by implica-
tion of law may be proved by parol: Newton et al. v. Taylor, 32 Ohi' St.
An implied or constructive trust may be established from the acts of
a party who has obtained money upon the faith of his agreement to buy
lands in the name of his wife, and, having bought them, takes the title
to himself: Id.
A husband, so receiving money, which would not have been advanced
unless upon the agreement that it was for the wife's benefit, and to he
invested in her name, is an agent for the wife, and by taking the deed
to himself, under such circumstances, makes himself a trustee ex male-
ficio: id.
If the husband is a participant in inducing the purchase for the wife's
benefit, receives the money for that purpose to invest in her name, and
then buys for himself, this is such a fraud as will create a trust against
him and those claiming under him with notice: Id.
Then it arises.-Where one accepts notes of another in trust to pay
such person's debt, and agrees with the creditor to either turn over the
note to him, or when collected to pay him the money, and enters upon
the performance of the undertaking, there will arise an obligation on his
part to execute the trust. faithfully, and an action lies in favor of the
creditor for a failure to do so, he makes himself a trustee for the cred-
itor, even though he receives no compensation : Walden v. Karr, 88 Ills.
UNITED STATES.
Not suable directly or indirectly-Judgment in l'ectment against its
Officers not an Estoppel to the Governent.-The United States filed a
bill to quiet the title to certain lots in its possession in San Francisco;
the defendant set up, by way of estoppel, certain judgments in eject-
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ment rendered by the state courts, at the suit of his grantor, against
certain officers of the government who, as its agents, had possession of
the lots ; in those actions the district-attorney, and additional counsel
employed by the Secretary of the Treasury appeared for the defendants,
and the title was contested on the trial : Held, that these facts consti-
tuted no estoppel against the government, although in California a
judgment in ejectment is, in ordinary cases, an estoppel both against
the tenant in possession and against the landlord who has notice of the
suit: Carr v. The United States, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
The United States cannot be estopped by proceedings against its
tenants or agents ; and cannot be sued without its consent; and such
consent can only be given by act of Congiess. No state can pass a law
making the United States suable in its courts : Id.
Without an act of Congress, no direct proceedings will lie at the suit
of an individual against the United States or its property; and no officer
of the government can waive its privilege in this respect, nor lawfully
consent that such a suit may be prosecuted so as to bind the govern-
ment: Id.
The government can only hold possession of its property by means
of its officers or agents, and to allow them to be dispossessed by suit,
would enable parties always to compel the government to come into court
and litigate its rights. Therefore, when it becomes apparent by the
pleadings, or the proofs, that the possession assailed is the possession
of the government by its agents, the jurisdiction of the court ought to
cease, and its proceedings cannot be set up as an estoppel against the
government: Id.
The cases in which the property of the government may be subjected
to claims against it, are those in which the property is in juridical pos-
session by the act of the government itself, or has become so without
violating its possession, and it seeks the aid of the court to establish or
reclaim its rights therein; in such cases it is equitable that the prior
rights of others to the same property should be adjudicated and allowed.
The cases of The Siren, 7 Wall. 152, and The Davis, 10 Id. 15, cited
and approved: Id.
VENDOR AND VENDEE.
Rescission by Fendee-Surrender of Possession.-A purchaser of land
by contract, who has paid the price and taken possession, cannot main-
tain an action to recover back the purchase-money, without giving up
the possession of the premises. He cannot retain the use of the estate
and maintain an action to recover back what he has paid-: Long v.
Saunders, 88 Ills.
WITNESS.
Wife not competent in Prosecution of Husband.-A wife is not a com-
petent witness for her husband in a criminal prosecution ; and he?
incompetency in such cases is not removed by either the criminal oi
civil codes of procedure: Schultz v. State, 32 Ohio St.
